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Questions on Citizenship

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An Intelligible Society

Modern citizenship is generally conceived as an ideal ensemble of three features. First, it is a juridical status which confers rights and obligations *vis-à-vis* a political collectivity. According to the classical division proposed by T. H. Marshall in 1948,[1] this status is divided in turn into three elements: the civil element, the rights which are necessary in terms of individual freedoms – freedom from arbitrary detainment, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of belief, property and contract rights, and access to an egalitarian justice system; the political element, the right to participate in the exercise of government, either as members of a governing body or as participants in their nomination; and the social element, a minimum share in economic wealth and social security through the distribution of the goods which are available and valued in a given society.

Citizenship is also a group of specific social roles which are unlike the private, professional and economic roles. Through these roles, each citizen, regardless of her place in the division of political work, is placed in a position to make choices (or to accept them, or to participate in them) between contradictory propositions, even if they appear to her as equally legitimate. (It is perhaps perfectly legitimate to ask that the state does not interfere in the citizen's management of her private life and is more active in the protection of and subsidization for her; but there is, after all, a limit to the violation of the principle of non-contradiction.) The

constitution of the citizen's role depends on an adequate political culture which facilitates in particular the intelligibility of the state: the recognition of the necessity of an authority which is rational, that is, non-arbitrary and non-contradictory; loyalty *vis-à-vis* the 'universal' institutions, as opposed to exclusive groups; and an interest in public affairs. In scholarly language, this feature is sometimes designated as 'political competence'. It implies the possibility for the citizen to utilize her role to advance her interests successfully as a member of various social groups, defined in terms of occupation, gender, residence, social class, etc., in the political arena.

Citizenship is, finally, an ensemble of moral qualities which are considered necessary to the character of the 'good' citizen. In French, in both scholarly and popular languages, these moral qualities are termed 'civisme'. In reviewing the few French works devoted to this subject,[2] it is striking that, according to French public opinion (however vague this term might be), much more importance is given to the qualities which are relevant to social morality than to the qualities which are relevant to political morality. Qualities of conformity are considered more central to social morality than the qualities of participation. Devotion to one's country, or the significance of this notion, declines in all social classes and in all age groups, especially among the young. The only civic quality that is actually hegemonic is participation in voting; trade union militancy or partisan activity is always least important. Perhaps the only individuals who would rank political morality as most important would be the group of approximately 7 per cent of the students in lycée debates surveyed by Madeleine Grawitz. For them, civic morality implies an acceptance of a system which is 'unjust', 'reactionary', 'patriarchal' and 'bourgeois'. In so far as they interpret civic morality as a product of the dominant ideology, only anti-civisme would be moral from their perspective. By contrast, for the influential and virtuous majority, the good citizen must inquire about the affairs of her country, respect its laws and carefully attend to the education of her children. This relative contempt for political virtues bears out the recommendations made twenty years ago by Michel Crozier for the encouragement of effective citizens' participation:[3] a sufficient decentralization of authority; the existence of independent sources of authority, allowing minorities to escape coercion by the majority; and an education and selection system which places less emphasis on competitive examinations.

Whether or not one approves of these insights, there is no doubt that

citizenship implies that society and government can be intelligible. Intelligibility does not entail transparency or consent: citizenship does not abolish class struggle. This struggle is structured in terms of a system of communication between parties which originate in different conceptions of the public interest. There is, nevertheless, agreement that the 'public interest' does exist and that the parties have the right to participate in its elaboration and in the obligation of submission to society's laws.

None of this is obvious: society could very well be understood as totally opaque, or as a social war, and citizenship could be regarded as nothing but the diabolical weapon of the dominant for the disciplining of the dominated in battles which are not their own. (The workers' movement has at times taken this position, which recalls the ambiguous attitude of socialists towards the Dreyfus affair and their hesitations regarding anti-fascism during the interwar period.) There are still many other conceptions of citizenship. The sociology of citizenship appears at least to be in agreement on the necessity of cultural unification for the promotion of this conception of the world.[4] This is not only the product of a movement of ideas, but of transformations in the material existence of societies: political centralization, increasing divisions of labour, occupational mobility, development of technical knowledge, and extraction of the social surplus not through directly political means, but through the play of a market which exceeds the limits of the primary communities.

Community and Political Community

Both cultural unification, and the specific form of that unification, are important. It is true that citizenship implies a 'sense of community' in the terms of Marshall, 'the sentiment of belonging directly to a community, based on a loyalty *vis-à-vis* a civilization which is truly common to all ... a loyalty of free persons endowed with rights and protected by a common law'.[5] Rousseau states that the citizen gives to the nation a part of his *amour-propre*. But if this bond implies a certain spiritual interiorization of the social structure (which is either 'relational' and therefore 'convivial', or always 'stratified' and therefore non-egalitarian) and truly merits the qualifier 'communitarian', this community is only remotely analogous to the *Gemeinschaft* of Tönnies or the *esprit de corps* of Ibn Khaldoun. There are three differences: the group is smaller in the

'traditional community', the division of labour therein is simpler and above all more stable, and the bonds of solidarity do not have the same foundation.

Modern citizenship is truly the social element of a group and therefore an engagement *vis-à-vis* a group, but this 'group' is an abstraction without an immediate and concrete signification (like that of a primary group of a group of interests). The terms of other citizenships, 'familial', 'associational', 'partisan', 'trade union' and 'entrepreneurial', are not only metaphorical, but also empty the conception of citizenship of its meaning. They suppress the connotation of citizenship as an element which is proper to a modern political community. The latter reorganizes individuals and groups which are not immediately linked by a mutual dependence, but have as their only shared characteristic the same juridical attributes and, in principle, access to the same cultural resources for the exercise of these attributes. The modern political community organizes a division of political labour, between the citizens and governors, without reference to the organization of primary groups and the division of social labour. The 'public' affairs are not those of people who know each other or of people who are in the same 'camp', but instead, 'the terrains of action and interaction where the collective needs of individuals who do not know each other converge, are recognized, organized and administered'.[6]

Citizenship therefore establishes a double relation in terms of interests. On the one hand, it is derived from interests: those individuals who consider their interests as properly served through citizenship are recognized as the best citizens, and those who possess the most 'capital' (material, cultural or technological) are recognized as the most competent. But, on the other hand, citizenship is also a resource which permits more of the socially disempowered to acquire a greater political competence and to defend their interests more effectively. It is in this latter sense that Marshall views citizenship as a weapon in the class struggle which facilitates the politicization of social protest, the conquest of the public space by interests which have been excluded, and, at the same time, the dynamic education in the rules of the game in this space. Everyone who is in a position of social power knows that in face-to-face conflictual relations, an encounter with a fellow citizen is more agreeable than an encounter with a stranger (the argument for 'civic solidarity' does sometimes win out over others). Citizenship is a useful weapon in this sense, but those in positions of social power also know that if a fellow citizen has greater resources for negotiation such that she can

extract concessions, citizenship can also turn against them.

One of the consequences which follows from this situation, and which is not always recognized, is that citizenship only exists if there is a social space between the public and private spheres. If society is conceived as a confrontation between particular interests or as the product of the political activity of the state, the possibility of citizenship is excluded. Citizenship depends on two simultaneous developments: the autonomous mobilization of interests, which is an expression of a limited social pluralism, and the communal participation in the activities of the political centre, which is an expression of a widespread and stable devotion to the symbols of the community. There is an intermediary sphere between private matters and the affairs of the state which is, perhaps, the most strategic. This is the sphere of altruistic participation in voluntary associations; although the latter are not directly political in character, they are, nevertheless, 'reservoirs of citizenship'.

Nationality and Citizenship

The majority of modern states establish a link between citizenship and nationality.[7] Whether this association is regarded as the product of biology or the effect of a contract (such as, for example, the 'civic oath' in French revolutionary legislation through which a nation is chosen and its rules are accepted), and whether it signifies a bond with a nation which is conceived as an ensemble of multiple interests, or submission to a uniform standard, nationality is considered as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the exercise of citizenship. By extension, national sentiment has been traditionally associated with 'civisme'. If public opinion, at least in France, places less importance on this link, not one government in a single country appears to have renounced it. Double nationality is always perceived as a specific and exceptional case. Citizenship, nationality and cultural community are superimposed.

Conversely, it is also not legitimate to claim political rights for cultural communities which are differentiated by their language or their ethnicity. Access to political rights does not result in the disappearance of non-national cultural symbols, but in their reduction to 'folkloric' symbols which are in themselves insufficient as a foundation for legitimate political bonds. Entities which extend beyond national alignments, such as the groupings in universalist ideology or transnational class discourse, are also not legitimate political bodies. In the collective

consciousness, or at least in that of the intellectual producers of the dominant symbols, conflicts and inequalities are usually understood in functional terms (manual workers versus non-manual workers, wage-earners versus the bosses), morphologically (lower revenues versus higher revenues), or ideologically (right versus left), but not in terms of ascribed status (minority language versus dominant language, women versus men, for example).

If colonial conflicts, in which the issue is precisely the constitution of the new nation-state, are excepted, all important ideologies use universal metaphors to describe the relations between the dominant and the dominated within each state. Citizenship levels out and depoliticizes cultural differences. The democratic version of the nation represents the political as a mechanism for the confrontation and communication between the 'parties'. Party members can change their political identity by eventually abandoning their party. It is always possible to transfer one's loyalty from one party to another; only citizenship's national loyalty is not transferable. Naturalization is an entirely different process from changing one's vote.

In this conception, citizenship depends on three elements, moving from the more 'material' to the more 'symbolic': (1) a division of labour which ensures sufficient economic growth, such that relative satisfaction of social expectations of greater incomes and increased equality is secured; (2) geographical and occupational mobility, which is facilitated by an understanding between different cultural groups, and which is both accepted by the new entrants (into a new business, region, profession, etc.), and tolerated by those in established positions; (3) symbols of collective identification which are accepted by those who are 'still at the door'. These symbols must permit the latter group of newcomers to aspire to and attain the realization of the first two conditions, and to pay the 'cost of access' to the community. The cost of access for the first generation is generally their ostracism from those who are already settled in the community: workers are stereotyped as 'dirty' and 'drunkards', Corsicans as 'violent' and 'lazy', etc. The fundamental instrument of citizenship is the existence of a cultural and academic industry,[8] which not only successfully establishes the idea that political homogenization is a useful tool for both the 'outsiders' and the subordinated, but also realizes, to a certain extent, this idea. If an excluded group does not benefit from any one of these three elements, and if it also possesses a strong cultural tradition, a new nationalism and a new citizenship might develop, resulting in the creation of their own state and their own cultural industry.[9]

Cultural Pluralism

These processes work well as long as the modern society in the original nation-states achieves economic growth and sufficiently meets the symbolic demands of its citizens, and the new nations provide more or less the same achievements for their own citizens. The problem is evidently somewhat more complicated when the situation is inverted; there is a strong possibility that the cultural industry could increasingly fail to perform its homogenizing function. Certain regional groups in the older nations could decide retrospectively that they have paid too much in terms of the cost of access to citizenship because they believe that citizenship now offers them little in return.

The case of immigrant workers is even more complex. Their arrival, an effect of the failures of the economy and the cultural industry in the new states, has suddenly increased with decolonization. The relative difference between this and other waves of immigration is that these immigrants want to share in the distribution of the nation's material goods, but they are hardly interested at all in identifying with the political values of the same community.

The material motives appear to be the most important, even if they are always combined with others. In the division of labour, the majority of immigrants who do find work only have access to employment which does not require their passage through the cultural industry. They increasingly hope that their children will enjoy greater success because this passage is, in their children's case, mandatory. Their aspirations, however, are blocked in so far as the children do not succeed, or in so far as the education system itself, apart from the problem of cultural confrontation, is caught up in an identity crisis of its own. (This identity crisis corresponds to the crisis of 'mis-production', the idea that the academic product is sound and that it can in turn provide for the satisfaction of social expectations for the 'disadvantaged'.) The immigrants are obviously not represented among the elements of the national cultural industry, the civil servants, judges, police, engineers, etc., with intellectuals and artists as the only exceptions. Also, it is probably the opinion of immigrant intellectuals, especially African intellectuals, that the non-intellectuals scarcely view the intellectuals as their representatives.

The bonds with either their primary groups, clientele, religious groups or original nationality – even if the immigrant does not exercise her original citizenship – are therefore considered more real and more significant in their understanding of their class or marginality. None of these factors contributes to the harmonization and communication between different cultural groups.

The model of the community represented by the European nation-states is therefore no longer an attractive one. It signifies, perhaps, an unnecessary luxury, but, more importantly, it signifies imperialism (or, for the regionalists, the 'Parisian colonialism', which is, in truth, French colonialism) rather than liberty–equality–fraternity.

Cultural pluralism develops on these foundations. This is, then, a model for the construction of political identities based on sub- or trans-national elements: language, ethnicity, region, religion and race. It is linked with a type of organization of the social in which society is viewed as a mosaic of compartmentalized solidarities, and the system of justice must pursue the distribution of equal parts of the national wealth to each cultural segment. This situation is a modern one. The traditional empires confronted apparently similar problems, which they successfully dealt with for centuries, but only to the extent that authority was not legitimated through representation but through an external authority (God, the cosmos, a group endowed with special attributes which set them apart), or to the extent that this authority demanded a minimal loyalty from peripheral groups, and let them pursue economic self-sufficiency. This traditional model was broken with the gradual process of modernization and capitalization which accompanied the formation of the nation-state. Actual pluralism is 'post-national'. It separates the construction and maintenance of peripheral solidarities from the acceptance of the rules of administration and identification with the symbols of the central authority. The central authority must do something in return for the peripheral groups in so far as a self-subsistent existence is no longer possible. The claim that citizenship and nationality are not linked together is based on the paradoxical and yet rigorously logical character of these requirements.[10]

One or Many Political Communities?

One of the problems in the ethics of citizenship is the determination of the citizen's obligation towards the state: is her primary obligation

towards the government or towards the society as a pact of association?[11] This determination is complicated by cultural pluralism to the extent that a society appears to take the form of many societies, each with its own political community. The stages of this transformation could be described in the following manner.

Education becomes more pluralist in terms of religious values, opinions, languages and cultural differences. Language instruction is no longer limited to a single language of communication and no longer ensures professional integration. Either the education system becomes increasingly less sufficient for the minorities even as they demand its diversification (the case of the Lebanese Shi'ites demonstrates that it is the most disadvantaged who are the victims of an education system which is dispersed across different communities); or it remains a truly 'national' one and becomes a place for consumption and marketing, in which the student no longer invests a sense of loyalty; or it fully adapts to the ethnic-social mosaic and becomes a terrain for the political mobilization of particular groups.

The system of political representation can change. Representation in the terms of democratic pluralism is based in part on a system of competing parties wherein interests are always negotiable and non-absolute. The 'new movements' which are likely to develop would be founded, by contrast, on a sense of identity which is absolute because it is prescribed (race and ethnicity, but also sex, age and sexual practices), rather than a position in the social contract (in the labour market, for example). These movements will not demand representation to improve their contractual position but to establish their autonomy on a metaphorical terrain in which identity is non-negotiable. The most activist movements will demand that the state assists them in constituting their internal sovereignty whereupon the state would abandon its regulatory function. The right to difference will recede with this collective narcissism and the refusal of interaction.

The levels of citizenship multiply, and this in turn creates a vertical expansion. De Tocqueville, like Durkheim, claimed that these different levels (local, regional, professional, associative, etc.), in conferring on individuals greater powers for the realization of their objectives, and in giving a concrete form to relations of cooperation and reciprocity, permit these individuals both to escape anonymity and to develop an improved consciousness of their civic obligations. However, it is also possible that this process arrives at a different result, namely the affirmation

of right without obligation. Obligation could be continually referred to a higher level. The combination of resistance against the construction of a nuclear plant or a mosque in one's own community with acceptance of, or even a demand for, a national nuclear energy plan and religious freedom is an entirely natural attitude.[12] Perhaps the new development in this respect is the weakening of regulations and arbitrations. For example, the deprived can be defended in an irresolvable manner in which the normative limits to individuals needs are denied and no distinction is made between social needs defined in terms of security, well-being or moral freedom. At the same time, the complete interpenetration of the public and private spheres,[13] which transforms an infinite number of problems into the 'state's affairs' (for example, spanking children is forbidden by law in Sweden), could promote the coexistence of a 'negative citizenship', wherein each individual demands more guarantees for her private needs, with the utilization by private communities of public means in the defence of their own interests. The distance between the legitimate defence of a specialized practice, and the pursuit of reparations by a deprived collectivity, defined in terms of a neighbourhood or an ethnic group, is not that great. The fact that public authority sometimes serves particular interests is not new, but what is perhaps more original is that these interests claim to be legitimate public authorities. 'Plogoff—Kaboul same fight' reads the graffiti on the walls of a village which is resisting against the construction of a nuclear power plant. But this depiction of these three stages is of course nothing but a caricature which has absolutely no relation with any actually existing individuals ...

The Explosion of Communication

Most of the western countries are experiencing a major expansion in communication. The explosion of language which has been produced in this expansion greatly exceeds the language training that is necessary for the modern worker. The consequence for the intelligibility of society which is closely associated with citizenship, or, on the terms of Jürgen Habermas, the consequence for competence in political communication, is that the grounding of the rational conviction of the citizen is no longer given.[14] In French opinion polls, the majority of the respondents stated that the 'affairs of the state' (in 1971) or 'politics' (in 1977) are decidedly complicated and that their complexity indicates the competence of

political specialists first and foremost (72 per cent in 1971, 58 per cent in 1977; the state is more feared than politics ...) Would the results from this self-evaluation have been different in 1940 or in 1950? Our findings in this respect are reduced to the construction of impressions based on other information.

The explosion in communications produces two ambiguous effects.

In the expansion of communications, the development of horizontal communities, covering a specified territory, embracing a large field of problems, and, in principle, addressing all the concerns of the inhabitants, is at first emphasized over the development of local communities and vertical communities (in which the individual is defined in terms of one privileged aspect of his existence, such as the corporation, the professional association, the masonic lodge, the caste).[15] It could be argued that this process is presently being inverted. In their globalization, communications produce a double effect: international affairs become close at hand, but the sense of nation becomes less intelligible to the extent that the nation appears less self-sufficient and therefore more dependent in international terms. It becomes increasingly difficult for the state to explain, convincingly, its political position (economic, agricultural, social or strategic) since it appears alternatively as autonomous ('if the state has a political stance, it is only because this particular political tendency has developed on its own') and dependent ('if the state's political approach does not work, this is because of international constraints').

This situation can lead to the stimulation of national citizenship if the individual arrives at the conclusion that the government is not the sole owner of political truth, and if the reverence for the political experts, who are supposed to possess the solution to political conflicts, declines. However, it can also have the opposite effect. It can suppress global information and emphasize instead relations which are differentiated in terms of individual preferences or professional interests (the worlds of rock music, financial information, the community of biologists, of Judaism, of Islam or of Médecins sans Frontières). Vertical communities are thereby constructed, which is in itself perfectly legitimate, but in this case without communication between them. Concerns about the centralized control of communications and production for the community as a whole are quite proper and reasonable, but concerns about the possibility of the coexistence of multiple micro-communities are also justified.

Among the intellectual elites, the explosion of communications has produced a systematic critique of the media producers who create images which contain nothing but the discourse of authority. 'The spectacle is the uninterrupted discourse which the present order holds with itself, its eulogistic monologue. It is the autoportrait of authority at the time of its totalitarian management of the conditions of existence.'[16] Since then, there has been no more information, only simulacra; no more reality, nothing but representations (given by authority). As an extreme consequence of this critique, ideas are disconnected from all communicable and verifiable reality, and acquire a life of their own, protected from all rational refutation. 'The petrol crisis is an alibi for the power of the monopolies'; 'information on Iran is a manifestation of a hateful incomprehension of Islam'; 'information on the Soviet Union is fundamentally an anti-communist discourse', etc. The critique of the simulacra ends in the transformation of all information which is not coded and made meaningful in an ideological system into irrelevance. There is, therefore, nothing but a constant flow of self-referential simulacra without a single instance of communication or judgement, except the judgement which declares the 'good' (but for whom?). The intelligibility of society is no longer destroyed by a lack but by an excess: each individual has their own system which can be deployed at will to demystify the simulacra and distinguish between them and other discourses. The critique of the media and the spectacle produces a succession of complacent exhibitions of criticism, which are themselves nothing but spectacles. Citizenship is diluted in the nonsense.

Pluralist Citizenship

In classical political theory, the conception of citizenship which is based on the conformity to laws in exchange for the protection of the social order is traditionally opposed to the conception of citizenship which is based on permanent and regular participation in political activities.[17] The first conception, expressed for example by Jean Bodin, insists on the private dimension, while the second, originally developed by Aristotle, insists on the public dimension. Benjamin Constant made this distinction the key to the opposition between the modern conception of freedom (private and bourgeois within the great states) and the ancient conception of freedom (public in the small city-states) and rightly links this distinction to the fundamental transformations in the organization

of production.[18] He recognizes that in the modern world, the first conception ultimately leads to the privatization and domination of the citizen by the forces of commerce, while the second ultimately results in the manipulation of the citizen by political and ideological professionals. In contemporary terms, the logical conclusions of these conceptions are, in the first case, the creation of a nomocratic state governed by the rule of law, but, above all, the law of the market and the individual interest of the rational actor, and, in the second, the creation of a telocratic state, which pursues the project of social transformation in the name of the law of history or the interest of the 'masses'. The first type of state abandons society to its own devices as long as the law, the social order, morality, the police and the army are well respected. The second type annexes society in modelling its organization on that of political and administrative bureaucracies.

Modern citizenship rests on two mechanisms: representation, upon which Constant insists, and the corporation (in the terms of Hegel, the professional and social groups which form 'the ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society').[19] In other words, citizenship is a profoundly pluralist mechanism and offers little satisfaction for those who seek unity in all aspects of life. Representation, in structural terms, is always a betrayal of that which we desire, or believe we desire, and therefore constitutes an act of dispossession for the citizen. The corporations permit the multiple manifestations of interests which are structurally in conflict with one another and disturb the majestic rationality which the philosophers of the nomocratic and telocratic states believe to be in the real.[20] However, it is in this mediocre zone that the citizen engages in her activities, which undoubtedly explains why a dose of civic virtue is indispensable therein for the linking of interests to the political community.

Pluralist citizenship is besieged by four problems:

The crisis of the cultural industry of the nation-state which encounters difficulties in the attainment of a minimum of relative equality in the distribution of cultural and material goods and in the satisfaction of social expectation.

The difficulty, in French political culture, of instilling confidence in the social organizations' (or 'socio-publics'') ability to take charge of social needs; each one is linked to a contractual management which is detached from the guardianship of the state on the condition that those who undertake this management benefit from the public prerogatives or

public resources. A poor form of the 'benevolent', this manager has no place between the civil servant, the militant, the contract worker and the marginal.

The communication between the different cultural groups: in the moment that the French demonstrated in 1977 an increasing cultural indifferentiation, they affirmed the right to difference and that which we have named cultural pluralism. How can citizenship be combined with the coexistence of different cultural groups which only communicate between themselves with the deafness of resentment?

The questions of symbols of identification (with what exactly, with the community or with communities?) is perhaps the most delicate. Uneven cleavages may be known throughout the whole of society, bearing on cultural differences, familial values, eating habits, living standards, partisan or ideological identities, the transcendent or profane 'ultimate values', the meanings of the identity of the political community.

A conception of citizenship which would accommodate all social cleavages simultaneously has not yet been elaborated. Better (or worse) still, the citizenship of the democratic nation-state seems to solicit the smoothing out of the primary cleavages and the suppression of the most recent.[21] What happens when the development of cultural pluralism, like the attitudes in public opinion, seems to manifest a weakening (relative weakening: the British Crown is still well established, but what do the Antilleans or Pakistanis in London or Manchester think of it?) of the great unifying symbols? Can a government reactivate these great symbols to defend its industry against 'foreign capital' and de-activate them to allow 'foreigners' to become 'citizens' at the same time? Obviously, there remains the identification with the 'international solidarity of workers' against the 'cosmopolitanism of capital', but this conception of the world has not yet constituted a single political community nor a single citizen.

Translated by Anna Marie Smith

Notes

1. T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1950.

2. For example, *Actualités: Documents (études d'opinion), Les Français et l'état*, Premier

ministre, Comité interministériel pour l'information, April 1971. Alain Duhamel, 'Le consensus français', in SOFRES, *L'Opinion française en 1977*, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris 1978, pp. 87–117. Madeleine Grawitz, *Elèves et enseignants face à l'instruction civique*, Bordas, Paris 1980.

3. Michel Crozier, 'Le citoyen', in Club Jean Moulin, *L'État et le citoyen*, Le Seuil, Paris 1961.

4. Morris Janowitz, 'Observations on the Sociology of Citizenship: Obligations and Rights', *Social Forces*, September 1980, pp. 1–24.

5. On this point, see also François Bourricaud, 'A quelles conditions les sociéties post-industrielles sont-elles governables?', in Jean-Louis Seurin, *La Démocratie pluraliste*, Economica, Paris 1980, especially pp. 162ff.

6. James Rosenau, 'Vers une nouvelle instruction civique', in Seurin, *La Démocratie pluraliste*, p. 271. That the meeting of these needs could be possible, that is, that in the end public matters could be resolved without the exclusion of a group, is evidently the stake of pluralist democracy.

7. The USSR is an exception, especially in its early history. It should also be emphasized that the 'multinational state' is closer in this regard to the conception of 'empire' than to the conception of the 'nation-state'.

8. This term, cultural industry, does not refer here to the transformation in the commodities produced through artistic labour, but simply to the production of education and information services on a large scale by specialized organizations which are different from the small primary groups. For example, Pierre Bourdieu speaks in this sense of a 'cultural industry which is oriented towards the production ... of instruments for linguistic correction'. *Ce que parler veut dire*, Fayard, Paris 1982, p. 51.

9. I am reorganizing and simplifying the ideas of Ernst Gellner, 'Nationalism', *Theory and Society*, November 1981, pp. 753–76. The poverty of French sociological literature on nationalism and citizenship is regrettable.

10. See the interesting debates in the colloquium held on 5 and 6 December 1981, *Les Droits politiques des immigrés, Études*, 15, rue Monsieur, 75007 Paris.

11. Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on disobedience, war and citizenship*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1970; George Armstrong Kelly, 'Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship?', *Daedalus*, 1979, pp. 32–4.

12. Translator's note: In Britain, the combination of the demand for the construction of more major roads with the demand for the preservation of the countryside has been called the 'not-in-my-backyard' syndrome.

13. Although I can only make a passing reference to this problems here, I have attempted to formulate some general analyses in 'Pourquoi élire un President?', *Projet*, February 1981.

14. J. Habermas, *Raison et legitimité*, Payot, Paris 1978.

15. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, MIT Press, Massachusetts 1966. The terms 'horizontal' and 'vertical' communities are taken from Rosenau, 'Vers une nouvelle instruction civique', p. 272.

16. Guy Debord, *La Société du spectacle*, Champ Libre, Paris 1971. See the strong criticisms of Alain Finkeilkraut, *L'Avenir d'une négation*, Le Seuil, Paris pp. 72ff.

17. Walzer, *Obligations*, pp. 203–25.

18. Benjamin Constant, 'De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes' (1819), in *De la liberté chez les modernes*, Le Livre de poche, Paris, pp. 491–515.